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ABSTRACT
In this paper we develop an empirical model of equity analyst recommendations for firms in the
NASDAQ 100 during 1998-2003. In the model we allow recommendations to depend on publicly
observed information, measures of an analyst's beliefs about a stock's future earnings, investment
banking activity, and peer group effects which determine industry norms. To address the reflection
problem, we propose a new approach to identification and estimation of models with peer effects
suggested by recent work on estimating games. Our empirical results suggest that recommendations
depend most heavily on publicly observable information about the stocks and on industry norms.
In most of our specifications, the existence of an investment banking deal does not have a
statistically significant relationship with analysts' stock recommendations.
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Equity analysts play an important role in stock markets by reducing the duplication of costly effort and by
gathering information necessary for the efﬁcient pricing of stocks. For as long as there have been equity
analysts, however, there have been questions about the accuracy of their forecasts and their implicit buy and
sell recommendations (see Cowles (1933)). This is particularly true in the wake of the sharp stock price
declines fortechnologyﬁrms in 2000. Not onlydidrecommendedstocks vastlyunderperformthe market as
a whole during this period, but highly-publicized allegations of conﬂicts of interest have called into question
whether analysts were more concerned with helping their ﬁrms win investment banking business than with
producing accurate assessments of the prospects for the ﬁrms under scrutiny.
In this paper, we develop an empirical model of the recommendations generated by stock analysts.
We quantify the relative importance of four factors inﬂuencing the production of recommendations in a
sample of high technology stocks during the time period between 1998 and 2003. First, recommendations
must depend on fundamentals and commonly shared expectations about the future proﬁtability of the ﬁrm.
These expectations will be embedded in the stock price. Second, analysts are heterogeneous, both in terms
of talent and perhaps in terms of access to information. We try to capture an individual analyst’s private
belief about the stock by looking at the difference between the quarterly earnings forecast submitted by the
analyst (or the analyst’s brokerage ﬁrm) and the distribution of forecasts from other ﬁrms. Mindful of the
large number of inquiries into possible conﬂicts of interest among research analysts, we include as a third
2factoradummyvariableforaninvestmentbankingrelationshipbetweenthe ﬁrmandtheanalyst’semployer.
Finally, we consider the inﬂuence of peers on the recommendation decision. Peer effects can impact the
recommendation in different ways. Individual analysts have incentive to condition their recommendation
on the recommendations of their peers, because even if their recommendations turn out to be unproﬁtable
ex-post, performance evaluation is typically a comparison against the performance of peers. More subtly,
recommendations are relative rankings of ﬁrms and are not easily quantiﬁable (or veriﬁable) objects. As
such, ratings scales usually reﬂect conventions and norms. The phenomenon is similar to the college
professor’s problem of assigning grades. If a professor were to award the average student with a C while
other faculty give a B+ to the average student, the professor might incorrectly signal his views of student
performance. Even while there is heterogeneity in how individual professors feel about grading, most
conform to norms if only to communicate clearly with students (and their potential employers) about their
performance. Similarly, analysts have an incentive to benchmark their recommendations against perceived
industry norms.
The choice of a recommendation is naturally modeled as a discrete choice problem. It is important to
recognize, however, thatifanalystsbenchmarktheirrecommendationtotherecommendationsoftheirpeers,
then the choice of one analyst is simultaneously determined with the choices of other analysts. Therefore,
our principal econometric model is a system of simultaneous discrete choice models. Recently, industrial
organization economists have proposed computationally simple estimators that can be applied to discrete
games. Examples include Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), Berry (1992), Tamer (2002), Seim (2003),
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Berry and Pakes (2002), Pakes, Ovstrovsky, and Berry (2003), Bajari,
Benkard and Levin (2003), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) and
3Sweeting (2004). Following the literature, we propose a simple two-step estimator for this game.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, our paper is one of the ﬁrst applications
of new techniques for estimating discrete games (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Pakes, Ovstrovsky,
and Berry (2003), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)). These
methods allow for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the game but are simple to compute.
Second, we propose methods to identify the parameters of our model under weak functional form as-
sumptions. The identiﬁcation strategy is similar to Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004), but applied to a different
class of models. We demonstrate that two types of exclusion restrictions are sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation.
First, we search for variables that enter into the utility of a particular player, but which can be excluded from
the utility of other players. Shifts in these variables change the utility of a single player holding the rest
of the model parameters ﬁxed. Second, the models that we consider can generate multiple equilibria. We
demonstrate the model is identiﬁed if there are some variables that inﬂuence the selection of equilibria, but
otherwise can be excluded from the utility. We argue that the threat of sanctions by regulators such as New
York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer served as instruments that encouraged analysts to coordinate on
an equilibrum where more conservative recommendations were issued.
The third contribution is that, to the best our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst empirical paper to study biases
on recommendations from conﬂicts of interest for high technology stocks in the late 1990’s. The perceived
conﬂicts of interest were widely reported on during this time. Public conﬁdence in the markets was dam-
aged by the perception that analysts encouraged investors to buy stocks that they were privately disparaging.
However, the empirical literature has not quantiﬁed the bias from conﬂicts of interest during this episode.
T h e r ei sn o wah u g eﬁnance literature on the analyst’s role in the information production process and
4the question of whether or not analyst recommendations are valuable. Our paper touches on this literature,
even though our methods are quite different. In theory, we would expect analyst recommendations to have
value, otherwise they would not be produced (see Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). However, the empirical
literature has generated a mixed picture about the direct value of analyst information. Cowles (1933) was
one of the ﬁrst researchers to question whether investors could trade proﬁtably on analyst recommendations,
and concluded that they could not. In general, it was found that abnormal returns around a change in
recommendation were either very small, or mean reverting.2
In the last ten years, however, the ﬁnance profession has revisited this question and found evidence
of investment value associated with the analysts. Using data in the 1989-1991 time period, Womack
(1996) reports mean price increases of approximately 2.4% for buy recommendations and -9.1% for sell
recommendations. Barber, Lehavey, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) come to a similar conclusion using
data from the 1989-1996 period and a slightly different empirical strategy. Barber et. al. (hereafter BLMT)
ﬁnd that a strategy of purchasing the most highly recommended stocks outperformed holding the least
recommended stocks by almost 1% per month. This ﬁnding turned out to be robust after controlling for
transaction costs, risk, and other attributes in the recommended portfolios.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the environment for Internet stocks in the
late 1990s and how it was difﬁcult for brokerage ﬁrms to avoid perceptions that their dealings were tainted
by conﬂicts of interest. In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 we outline the model. In section 5
we study the identiﬁcation of the model. In section 6 we report the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The discouraging performance of the analysts in the Wall Street Journal’s popular “dartboard” competition is a persistent
reminder of this point.
52 The tech boom and analyst conﬂicts of interest
The latter 1990’s were witness to a dramatic rise and then subsequent decline in stock prices. This volatil-
ity was particularly pronounced in the technology-dominated NASDAQ. In January 1999, the NASDAQ
composite index was slightly over 2000. The index reached a high of over 5,000 about a year later, and
then fell to 1,300 by November of 2002. The ﬁrms listed on the NASDAQ are typically young ﬁrms that
are engaged in innovative but unproven lines of business. Relatively little is known about the demand for
the ﬁrms’ products and future performance is hard to predict from past performance. This would seem
to have been an ideal environment for equity analysts to enter, provide information, and add investment
value. It is puzzling that this did not happen at this key point in time. With hindsight, it appears obvious
now that stocks were priced with unrealistic expectations for earnings growth. Yet, the average equity an-
alyst appears to have been as optimistic as any market participant leading up to the crash in the NASDAQ.
BLMT (2003) updated their earlier study on the investment value of analyst in the early 1990s to show that
analyst recommendations were much less valuable during 1996-2001 time period. In 2000 and 2001, the
least recommended stocks earned an average abnormal return of 13%, while the most highly recommended
stocks earned average abnormal returns of -7%.
BLMT note that the list of most highly recommended stocks in 2000-2001 contained an inordinate
number of small cap stocks, which turned out to be the ones that fell most in value. These ﬁrms, of
course, are usually young and have relatively more demand for investment banking services than more
mature ﬁrms. Some researchers have established the link between certain types of ratings outcomes and
investment banking.3 Lin and McNichols (1998) document that analysts tend to give more favorable ratings
3 BLMT do not actually speak to whether conﬂicts of interest could be responsible for their results.
6and more optimistic long term growth forecasts to ﬁrms when their own company serves as an underwriter
to the ﬁrm. Michaely and Womack (1999) show how stocks recommended by a brokerage ﬁrm that also
managed the initial public offering of the stock lead to signiﬁcant underperformance relative to unafﬁliated
analyst recommendations.4 This explanation of analyst behavior gained even more credence when several
securities ﬁrms were forced to disclose internal documents that seemed to show investment banker inﬂuence
on the analyst recommendation. Elliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, issued a complaint
on the matter which eventually led to a $600 million dollar settlement involving a host of the leading Wall
Street investment banks.
Unlike many papers in this literature, we choose to focus our analysis on a relatively short time period
and a small sample of ﬁrms. We focus on a period (the late 1990s) and a set of stocks (technology ﬁrms)
where the role of the analyst was alleged to have been most dysfunctional. We do this for several reasons.
First, we believe that the inﬂuence of norms and peers is likely to be greatest in cases where there is
substantial uncertainty about fundamentals. Second, if we are to differentiate between conﬂicts of interest
and other explanations, we require a time period with variation in the pressures from these alleged conﬂicts.
Once Elliot Spitzer’s investigation was public knowledge, there was surely less pressure on analysts to
boost their recommendations. It turns out that the timing of the Spitzer investigation serves nicely as an
instrument for estimating our model.
3 The data
The data consist of the recommendations on ﬁrms that made up the NASDAQ 100 index as of year-end
4 Other papers that examine conﬂicts of interest between investment banking and research analysis include Ali (1996), Chan,
Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003), Dugar and Nathan (1995), Francis and Philbrick (1993), and Korajczk, Lucas and McDonald
(1991).
72001. The recommendations were collected from Thomson Firstcall. Firstcall is one of the most compre-
hensive historical data sources for analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts, containing real-time
recommendations and forecasts from hundreds of analysts. It is common for analysts to rate ﬁrms on a 5
point scale, with 1 denoting the best recommendation and 5 denoting the worst. When this is not the case,
Firstcall converts the recommendations to the 5 point scale (see table 3.1).
We have 12,719 recommendations from analysts at 185 brokerage ﬁrms between January 1998 and June
2 0 0 3( s e eT a b l e2 ) . T h ed a t as e tw a sf o r m e db y merging the earnings and recommendations ﬁles from
Firstcall. In a given quarter, for a given stock, we merge a quarterly earnings forecast with a recommen-
dation from the same brokerage.5 This will allow us to determine if analysts that are more optimistic than
the consensus tend to give higher recommendations. In the Firstcall data, quarterly earnings forecasts are
frequently made more than a year in advance. In order to have a consistent time frame, we limit analysis to
forecasts that were made within the quarter that the forecast applies.6 Note that not every recommendation
can be paired with an earnings forecast made within the contemporaneous quarter. Recommendations that
could not be paired with an earnings forecast were dropped from the results that we report. However,
qualitatively similar results were found for a data set where this censoring was not performed. We choose
not to report these results in the interests of brevity. The variables in our data include:
• REC- Recommendation from 1-5 for a stock listed in the NASDAQ 100 recorded by I/B/E/S.
• QUARTER- Quarter during which the recommendation was submitted.
• STOCK-Name of the stock for which the recommendation applies.
• BROKERAGE-The brokerage employing the analyst.
• EPS-Earnings per share forecast submitted by the analyst’s brokerage associated with the recommen-
dation. Submitted during the same quarter as the recommendation.
5 When there were multiple recommendations within a quarter, we chose to use the last recommendation in the results that
we report.
6 We chose to merge the brokerage ﬁeld, instead of the analysts ﬁeld, because the names and codes in the analysts ﬁeld were
not recorded consistently across IBES data sets for recommendations. It was possible to merge at the level of the brokerage.
8• AEPS-Average of the earnings per share forecasts submitted for that quarter.
• RELATION-A dummy variable that is one if the analyst’s brokerage engages in investment banking
business with the company to which the recommendation applies.
• IBANK-A dummy variable that is equal to one if the brokerage does any investment banking business
with stocks in the NASDAQ 100.
• SPITDUM-A dummy variable that is equal to one after the quarter starting in June of 2001. Based on
a comprehensive search of Wall Street Journal articles, this is when Elliot Spitzer began making very
public criticisms of industry practices.
• SBANK-the share of analysts that issued recommendations for a particular stock during a particular
quarter where IBANK was one.
The investment banking relationship was identiﬁed from several different sources. First, we checked
form 424 ﬁlings in the SEC’s database for information on the lead underwriters and syndicate members
of debt issues. When available, we used SEC form S-1 for information on ﬁnancial advisors in mergers.
We also gathered information on underwriters of seasoned equity issues from Securities Data Corporation’s
Platinum database. Transaction advisory services (mergers), and debt and equity issuance are not the only
services that investment banks provide. However, these sources contribute the most to total proﬁtability of
the investment banking side of a brokerage ﬁrm.
We provide some summary statistics for the variables in our data set in Table 3.2. The average rec-
ommendation in our data set is 2.2, which is approximately a buy recommendation. The mean value of
RELATION is 0.035. The mean valued of IBANK is 0.81. That is, three and one-half percent of the
analysts-company pairs in our data set were identiﬁed as having a potential conﬂict of interest due to in-
vestment banking activity. Eighty-one percent of the recommendations in our data were generated by ﬁrms
engaging in investment banking with at least one ﬁrm listed in the NASDAQ 100. Both of these variables
are potentially useful measures of potential conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s t . T h ev a r i a b l eR E L A T I O Ni sm o r ed i r e c t ,
since it indicates that the brokerage is engaged in investment banking with the company during the quarter
9the recommendation was issued. However, brokerages might view any company it is giving a recommen-
dation to as a potential client, particularly in the NASDAQ 100, where many of the companies generated
considerable investment banking fees.
3.1 Factors inﬂuencing recommendations
In this subsection, we discuss variables that could inﬂuence analysts’ recommendations. These variables
will enter into our empirical model in section 6.
The ﬁrst hypothesis we entertain is that recommendations are inﬂuenced by the analyst’s beliefs about
the fundamental worth of the company. In our data set, three variables will proxy for the analysts be-
liefs about the company fundamentals. The ﬁrst variable is the difference between the analyst’s earnings
forecast and the average earnings forecast issued within that quarter. If an individual analyst’s earnings
forecast is greater than the average, we interpret this to mean that he is more optimistic about the com-
pany’s future earnings than are his peers. If, all else held equal, analysts recommend stocks with higher
earnings prospects, then we would expect stocks that an analysts’ brokerage is more optimistic about to be
more highly recommended. The second and third variables are stock and time ﬁxed effects, which pre-
sumably capture publicly available information about the stocks which could inﬂuence recommendations.
Ideally, we would like to use valuation measures such as book-to-market and the P/E ratio. However, for
the NASDAQ 100 during the height of the technology stock boom, expectations about the growth of the
market and proﬁtability in possibly distant quarters may have been more important in determining both
market prices and recommendations. Given the breakdown in the relationship between stock prices and
more standard fundamentals, capturing publicly observed information about stocks through the use of stock
and time ﬁxed effects seems to us a more appropriate empirical strategy.
10A second factor that could inﬂuence recommendations is the potential conﬂict of interest posed by the
allure of capturing investment banking fees. Media reports and revelations from Elliot Spitzer’s investi-
gation lead one to suspect that some individual stock analysts may have played a key role in helping their
ﬁrms win investment banking business during this period.7 Yet, conﬂicts of interest were not something
new to this period. Indeed, Michaely and Womack (1999) report that in 1990-91 a buy recommendation by
an analyst whose ﬁrm took the stock public was signiﬁcantly less valuable than a buy recommendation by
an unafﬁliated analyst. What is interesting about our data set is that the conﬂict of interest temptation was
particularly acute in the early part of our sample because of the large demand for corporate ﬁnance at this
time for this set of ﬁrms. In effect, variation in the conﬂict of interest variable gives us a better chance of
precisely estimating its effect and the effects of the other variables in the model.
One key issue is how to construct the investment banking variable. Firms change their investment
bankers from deal to deal. Having once had an investment banking relationship does not necessarily imply
that an analyst must forever bias his recommendation. Accordingly, we measure the investment banking
relationship with a dummy variable equal to one if we can establish an investment banking relationship
either one year prior to or one year after a recommendation. We did not ﬁnd the results to be sensitive to
this assumption.
Thethirdfactorwhichcouldinﬂuencethechoiceofrecommendationisapeereffect. Table3.3illustrates
that the distribution of recommendations moved considerably over our sample period. While part of this
movement can be traced to covariates, we will argue that some of it is due to the inherent ambiguity of
7 In 1998, Goldman Sachs estimated that Jack Grubman, a prominent telecommunications industry analyst, would bring in $100
to $150 million in investment banking fees. This estimate was based on the fees generated by 32 of the stocks he covered
that also had banking relationships with Citigroup, including WorldCom, Global Crossing and Winstar Communications. (Wall
Street Journal, October 11, 2002).
11assigning grades.
As an example, consider the problem of assigning grades in the classroom. There is considerable
heterogeneity across schools in how grades are submitted. For instance, in United States graduate programs
in economics, it is rare to give any student a grade of “C” on coursework, particularly after the ﬁrst year.
However, in Law Schools, by comparison, grades of “C” and “D” are fairly common. Just like grades
differ substantially across schools and over time, different analysts (or brokerage ﬁrms) will have different
approachestogradingcompanies. Thesedifferentapproachesmayalsochangeovertimeinwaysnotrelated
to the fundamentals driving the performance of ﬁrms under analysis.
The key to our modeling approach is the observation that analyst recommendations are not wholly in-
dependent of each other even after taking into account their publicly-available information. That is, recom-
mendations should be modeled as a game. If one analyst is uniformly harsher in his evaluations than are
his peers, then he risks sending an incorrect signal about the ﬁrm under analysis. The heterogeneity in the
distribution of recommendations suggests that this game might have multiple equilibria. In the latter part of
our data set, well after the precipitous decline in NASDAQ stock prices, the distribution of recommenda-
tions shifted so that nearly 15 percent of the stocks received a recommendation of 4 or 5. Almost no stocks
had such poor recommendations in the early part of the sample, or even at the time of the steep decline in
prices.
4 Identiﬁcation and Estimation of Static Models of Strategic Interaction
In this section, we describe a strategy for the identiﬁcation and estimation of a static model of strategic
interaction. The estimation strategy is a straightforward application of recent work on estimating games by
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Pakes, Ovstrovsky and Berry (2003), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003),
12and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003). The speciﬁc estimator that we propose will be a parametric
implementation of these ideas. The parametric assumptions are used primarily because the number of
covariates in our data make nonparametric methods inappropriate. However, it is useful to study whether
the identiﬁcation of the model depends on parametric restrictions. Therefore, we consider nonparametric
identiﬁcation of the model. The identiﬁcation results are closely related to Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2004).
We include them in this document for completeness and to demonstrate how the strategies in Bajari, Hong
and Ryan (2004) can be extended to games of incomplete information.8
The model is a simultaneous move game of incomplete information. There are i =1 ,...,N players,
each with a ﬁnite set of actions Ai. Deﬁne A =
Y
i
Ai and let a =( a1,...,a N) denote a generic element
of A.P l a y e r i’s utility takes the following form:
ui(ai,a −i,x,ε)=fi(x,a)+εi(ai). (1)
In equation (1), utility depends on two terms. The ﬁrst is fi(x,a), a deterministic function that depends on
the covariates x and the actions a. The second term, εi(ai) is a random preference shock that inﬂuences i’s
utility from the action ai. We assume that the εi(ai) are draws from a distribution G that are i.i.d. across
actions and players. We assume that the εi(ai) are private information to each player.
Notice that (1) generalizes standard discrete choice models such as the multinomial logit or probit. In
these models, it is assumed that fi does not depend on a−i, the actions of other agents. A standard discrete
choice model is a special case of our framework where the number of players in the game is equal to one.
8 Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) consider games of complete information with multiple equilibrium. While the strategy of
the proofs is similar, the model we consider here has incomplete information and different implicit assumptions about equilibrium
selection. Ataminimum, webelievethattheseargumentsilluminatetheideasinBajari, HongandRyan(2004)inasimplercontext.
134.1 Identifying Assumptions from Discrete Choice
It is well known that (1) cannot be identiﬁed even in the special case of a standard probit model. Because
choices depend on the differences in the level of utility, there are standard identifying assumptions from
discrete choice that we will impose. The ﬁrst identifying assumption we make is:
A1. For every i and a−i ∈ A−i,w el e tfi(ai,a −i,x)=0for some chosen ai ∈ Ai and for all
a−i ∈ A−i.
The rationale for A1 is similar to the argument that we can normalize the mean utility from the outside
good equal to zero in a standard discrete choice model. In order to show that this assumption is without loss
of generality, we must verify that it does not change i’s ranking of over elements of A. Fix two elements
a∗ =( a∗
1,...,a ∗
N) and a0 =( a0
1,...,a 0
N) in A. Suppose that ui(a∗) ≥ ui(a0).T h e n






This inequality will not be affected by subtracting fi(ai,a −i,x) from both sides for all i.T h a t i s :
















Hence assumption A1 does not change the order on A.
A second assumption that we will make is:
A2. For every i and for every a, εi(a) are distributed i.i.d. extreme value.
In standard discrete choice models, it is not possible to identify both fi (a,x) and εi (a) nonparamet-
rically. We note that distributional assumptions on the error term are necessary even in a binary choice
model. Consider a standard binary choice model where the dependent variable is 1 if the index u(x)+ε is
14greater than zero, i.e.
y =1 ( u(x)+ε>0) (2)
Suppose that the economist observes P(y =1 |x), the probability that the dependent variable is equal to
o n eg i v e nt h ec o v a r i a t e sx. I ft h ec d fo fε is G, then (2) implies that:
P(y =1 |x)=G(u(x)), (3)
Equation (3) implies that it is not possible to separately identify G from u. In a binary choice model,
we can perfectly rationalize by assuming that u(x)=G−1 (P(y =1 |x)). Thus, in the binary case, this
assumption will be required for identiﬁcation. To see a discussion of the multivariate case, see Bajari, Hong
a n dR y a n( 2 0 0 4 ) .
We could change A2 to another standard parametric distribution used in the literature. Similar results
would hold in ordered models (such as the ordered logit or ordered probit) or models with different error
structures, such as the multinomial probit. The logit model is useful because choice probabilities can be
expressed in a closed form. This greatly simpliﬁes the notation and hence allows the reader to understand
the key ideas in our approach to identiﬁcation and estimation.
4.2 Equilibrium
Let Pi(ai|x) denote the probability that player i takes the action ai conditional on the covariates x. Then








15In equation (4) player i computes his utility from action ai by marginalizing out over his expectations about
the actions of other players, a−i. We note that because assumption A2, conditional on values of εi(ai),
ai ∈ Ai there is a unique best response for agent i with probability one. Therefore, the following system











We therefore deﬁne equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a collection of probability distributions, P∗
i (ai|x) such that





















The model of equilibrium in (6)-(7) has received considerable attention in the literature. See, for in-
stance, McKelvy and Palfrey (1995), Seim (2002), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Bayer, McMillan and Rueben
(2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Pakes, Ovstrovsky and Berry (2003), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2003) and Sweeting (2004). These papers establish the existence of equilibrium using standard
ﬁxed point arguments. However, equilibrium is typically not unique. Multiplicity is common in these
games and has been studied in detail by McKelvy and Palfrey (1995), Brock and Durlauf (2001,2003) and
Sweeting (2004).
4.3 Identiﬁcation
The problem of identiﬁcation is to recover the mean utilities, fi(ai,a −i,x) given the distributions Pi(ai|x)
16that in principal can be observed by the economist. We begin by noting that, conditional on x,w ec a n
rewrite (6) as follows:
For all i and any a0














In equation (8), we simply transform the choice probabilities implied by the logit model. This equation
tells us that conditional on x, we can write the mean utilities as the solution to a linear system in the choice
probabilities and the log choice probabilities. For a given x, there are only N1=
P
i #Ai − N such
equations that are not linearly independent. For each player, there are #Ai choice probabilities, however,
these probabilities must sum to one. It is this identity which introduces a linear dependence. The number






#Aj after we make the




The matrix B(x) is N1 × N2 and is formed with terms of the form P−i(a−i|x)). The mean utilities are
collected in the matrix f(x) which is N2 × 1.
Deﬁnition. Themodelisidentiﬁedifthefi(a,x)thatsatisfy(8)-(9)areuniquelydeterminedbyPi(ai|x).
Identiﬁcation means that the probabilities that we observe in the data, Pi(ai|x) are sufﬁcient to de-
termine fi(a,x). There is an implicit assumption about the selection of equilibrium in our deﬁnition of
17identiﬁcation. Given a value of x, there is at most one equilibrium played in the data. In principal there
could be multiple equilibria and agents could be randomly switching back and forth between the various
equilibria. This would complicate the identiﬁcation arguments and the estimation. We study this type
of framework in Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004). However, in this paper, we wish to include a very large
number of covariates, which would make the approach of Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) computationally
difﬁcult. Therefore, we consider this more stylized model.9
The ﬁrst result that we establish is that without restrictions on payoffs, the model is not identiﬁed.
Theorem 1 Suppose that A1 and A2 are satisﬁed. If N>1 and if for all i, #Ai > 1 then fi(a,x) is not
identiﬁed.
Proof: Holding x ﬁxed, the number of moments are equal to
P








This identiﬁcation result is similar to many nonidentiﬁcation results in the literature. See for instance,
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,1991), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003) and Bajari, Hong and Ryan
(2004). The basic problem is that the number of mean utility parameters, conditional on x, far exceeds the
number of moments available to the economist. Therefore, the model is not identiﬁed.
In order to identify the model, we must either increase the number of equations or decrease the number
of unknowns. Our solution to this problem is to impose exclusion restrictions on the fi(a,x).T h e ﬁrst
type of exclusion restriction that we use is below.
A3. For each agent i, there exists some continuous covariate, si, that enters i’s utility, but not the utility
of other agents. That is, i’s utility can be written as fi(a,x,si). We let s =( s1,...,s N) denote the
vector of shifters for all agents.
9 We note, however, that many of the identiﬁcation arguments that we suggest would have analogues in the framework of Bajari,
Hong and Ryan (2004).
18AssumptionA3impliesthatthereareagentispeciﬁcutilityshifters. Inourinvestmentbankingexample,
this could include the amount of investment banking business done by the ﬁrm or some other brokerage-
speciﬁc covariates. Our assumption implies, for instance, that investment banking work done by Merrill
Lynch does not directly inﬂuence the utility of Goldman Sachs for issuing a particular recommendation. To
a ﬁrst approximation, we believe this is a reasonable assumption.
In what follows, it will be useful to make the following assumption.
A4. Consider any ﬁnite number M of distinct values of (x,s),e . g .(x(1),s (1)),...,(x(M),s (M)). Con-



















Theorem 2 Suppose that A1-A4 hold. Then fi is identiﬁed.
Proof: Hold x ﬁxed. Consider a large, but ﬁnite number of values of si equal to M for each agent.
Considerthe allthedistinctvectors of theform (x,s1,...,s N)that canbe formedbyallowingforallpossible
permutations of the individual si. The number will be equal to KN. Consider the moments generated
by equation (9) generated by these KN distinct covariates. The number of moments is equal to N1 ·
KN. The number of mean utility parameters is equal to
X
i
K (#Ai − 1)
Y
j6=i
#A. Note that the number
of moments depends linearly on K but the but the number of moments grows exponentially with K. By
choosing sufﬁciently large values for K the mean von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities can be identiﬁed at
(x,s1,...,s N). Q.E.D.
The intuition behind the theorem above is quite simple. Because we have zeroed out the some elements
of fi, by considering all permutations of the (s1,...,s N) we can increase the number of moments at a
19squared rate and the number of parameters at a linear rate. It is easy to see that the conditions of the
theorem could be weakened slightly. All we need is that there are individual speciﬁc shifters for two of the
p l a y e r si nt h eg a m e . T h i si ss u f ﬁcient to increase the number of moments to allow for identiﬁcation of the
mean utilities. This is similar to an identiﬁcation strategy in Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004), but we apply it
here to games of incomplete information.
A second approach to identiﬁcation is to exploit the multiplicity of equilibria. Previous authors, such
as McKelvy and Palfrey (1995) and Brock and Durlauf (2001,2003), have demonstrated that models of the
form that we consider can generate multiple equilibria.
A5. There is a value x0 such that for an open set of values O(x0), the model generates multiple equi-
librium. Also, suppose that the probability distributions can be written as Pi(ai|x,z) where z is a
continuous variable which inﬂuences which equilibrium is played, but which does not enter payoffs.
As we mentioned earlier in the paper, these variables could include behavior in previous plays of the game
or actions by market regulators. We discuss instruments appropriate for our application in the next section.





























It will also be convenient to make the following assumption.
20A6. Consider any ﬁnite number M of distinct values of (x,z),(x1,z 1),...,(xM,z M) where xi ∈








. The matrix B(x1,...,x M) has full rank.
Theorem 3 Suppose that A1-A3 and A5-A6 are true. Then fi is identiﬁed in the set O(x0).
Proof: Hold x ﬁxed and consider #z distinct values of z. Then the number of moments generated by the
model is equal to N1 · #z. The number of parameters is equal to N2. Since the number of parameters
is independent of z, if we let #z become sufﬁciently large, the number of moments exceeds the number of
parameters and the fi are identiﬁed. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind the identiﬁcation is similar to Sweeting (2004). The multiplicity of equilibrium
generates additional moments that can assist with identiﬁcation. However, unlike Sweeting, in order to en-
sure identiﬁcation in our framework, it is necessary to have an exclusion restriction. Sweeting (2004) does
not need this condition because of he assumes a dichotomous choice and makes parametric assumptions
about the form of the mean utilities.10
4.4 Estimation
Methods for estimating models such as the one considered above have recently been explored by a number
of authors including Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Pakes, Ovstrovsky, and Berry (2003), Bajari, Benkard
and Levin (2003), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003). The basic strategy is to construct a
two-step estimator. The economist ﬁrst ﬂexibly estimates Pi(ai|x,s,z), the probability distribution of
the observed actions conditional on the covariates x, the vector of individual shifters s and the variables
10 Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) also study identiﬁcation when there is a variable that inﬂuences equilibrium selection, but
does not directly enter into utility.
21associated with an equilibrium shift z.W e e s t i m a t e fi(a,x) in a second step.
In principal, nonparametric estimation of such a model is possible. However, in our application, the
number of covariates is sufﬁciently large so that nonparametric methods are not appropriate, due, for in-
stance, to the inclusion of quarter, stock and broker ﬁxed effects that we will discuss in the next section.
Therefore, instead, we will use parametric methods.
Let t =1 ,...,T denote an observation in our data set. Let at, xt, st and zt denote the vector of actions
and the covariates for observation t. The approach we will take is to ﬁrst, ﬂexibly estimate a parametric
model Pi(ai|x,s,z,θ1) of the probability that player i takes action ai. This will be done, in our application,
by a linear regression. In the second step, given estimates of the vector of parameters, b θ1, and ﬁtted values


























Theloglikelihood(12)takesasgiventheﬁttedﬁrst-stageestimatesofthechoiceprobabilities b P−i(a−i,t|xt,z t,b θ1).
Given these estimates, we then simply maximize the likelihood of a standard multinomial choice model.
The econometric properties of two-step parametric estimators such as (12) are very well understood.
Since b P−i(a−i,t|xt,z t,b θ1) will be estimated with error, for any ﬁxed t our estimates will be biased. How-
ever, the estimator will be consistent as the number of observations tends to inﬁnity. See Newey and




(2001,2003)). An implicit assumption above is that conditional on the observed covariates, xt,s t,z t, there
is only a single equilibrium present in the data. The estimation method requires that if we see the same
values of xt,s t,z t, the same equilibrium will be selected. This assumption is implicit in most work on
estimation of discrete games (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2003), Pakes, Ovstrovsky, and Berry (2003),
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)). Recent work has tried
to weaken this assumption in similar models (see Sweeting (2004) and Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004)).
However, neither estimator can be applied to the problem that we study.11
We acknowledge that this assumption is strong and is unlikely to be perfectly satisﬁed in any applica-
tion. However, we believe that it is a useful starting point. Large investment banks have entire departments
devotedtoresearch. Thesedepartmentsproducethousandsofrecommendationseachyear. Therecommen-
dations are publicly observable and actively watched throughout the industry (sometimes recommendations
are front page ﬁnancial news). We argue that the repetition and observability of producing recommenda-
tions helps the industry to settle on somewhat standardized norms. Within a single market segment, such
as high technology stocks, this makes the single equilibrium assumption more plausible.
At a minimum, our approach contributes to the literature by empirically implementing recent research
on the estimation of games. Also, previous approaches to studying recommendations completely abstract
away from the simultaneity of analysts’ choices. We believe that generalizing the estimation of games to
allow for multiplicity will be an active area of future research.
11 The computational burden of Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) would be large given the potentially large number of players
and strategies in our game. The approach of Sweeting (2004) applied to problems with a dichotomous choice.
23Finally, we note that rewriting the utility can give us some further intuition into the identiﬁcation of the
model. In the literature, it is common to consider speciﬁcations in which the actions of other players enters
into payoffs linearly. Suppose that utility takes the form:
ui(ai,a −i,x,ε)=θ1 · (x,si)+δ b P−i(a−i,t|xt,s t,z t,b θ1)+εi(ai) (13)
Note that b P−i depends on the sj (j 6= i)a n dzt. These variables do not directly enter into the rest of the
utility function (i.e. (x,si)). Our exclusion restrictions therefore guarantee that the ﬁrst stage estimates are
not colinear with the other variables in the utility function. Thus, the model is identiﬁed.
5 Empirical Model
In this section, we lay out the model that we will take to the data. An observation is a recommendation
submitted for a particular stock during a speciﬁc quarter. We will let q =1 ,...,Q denote a quarter,
e =1 ,...,Ea stock and and i =1 ,...,Ian analyst. We will denote a particular recommendation by ri,s,t.
The recommendation can take on integer values between 1 and 5, where 1 is the highest recommendation
and 5 the lowest. Since the dependent variable can be naturally ranked from highest to lowest, we will
assume that the utilities come from an ordered probit. While the identiﬁcation and estimation results from
thelastsectionwerewrittenforthelogit(forexpositionalclarity), theseideasextendimmediatelytoordered
models.
Let xe,q denote a set of covariates that inﬂuence the recommendation of all the analysts for stock e
during quarter q. The vector si,e,q are variables that inﬂuence i’s recommendation and ze,q are variables
that inﬂuence the equilibrium selection.
Deﬁne the latent variable
24yi,e,q = β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q)+ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)+εi,e,q (14)
In equation (14), the term E(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q) is the expected recommendation for stock e during quarter q
and εi,s,q is an normal error term. Thus, conforming to the expected actions of peers enters into an individ-
ual analyst’s utility. In the ordered probit, the probability that a particular recommendation is observed is
determined as follows:
P(r =1 ) = Φ
¡
−β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)
¢
(15)
P(r =2 ) = Φ(µ1 − β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (16)
−Φ(−β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (17)
P(r =3 ) = Φ(µ2 − β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (18)
−Φ(µ1 − β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (19)
P(r =4 ) = Φ(µ3 − β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (20)
−Φ(µ2 − β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (21)
P(r =5 ) = 1 − Φ(µ3 − β0 · (xe,q,s i,e,q) − ηE(r|xe,q,s e,q,z e,q)) (22)
In equations (14)-(22), the likelihood that determines the probability that the recommendation is r depends
on the parameters β and η along with the cut points µ1 − µ3.
255.1 Exclusion Restrictions
The analysis of the previous suggestion suggests that identiﬁcation depends cruciallyo nh a v i n ga p p r o p r i a t e
exclusion restrictions. First, as in A3, we can use covariates that inﬂuence the payoffs of one particular
agent, but not other agents. In our analysis, the covariates will include broker ﬁxed effects and covariates
that reﬂect broker speciﬁc levels of investment banking activity. This assumption would imply, for instance,
that the investment banking level of Merrill Lynch should not directly inﬂuence the recommendations sub-
mitted by Goldman Sachs. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption.
Second, as in A5, identiﬁcation can be achieved by using covariates z(e,q) that inﬂuence the selection of
equilibrium, but which do not directly enter into payoffs. The ﬁrst set of covariates is based on the actions
of market regulators. Beginning in June of 2001, the State Attorney General of New York, Elliot Spitzer,
began to question business practices in this industry. Spitzer criticized investment banks for issuing a large
fraction of strong buy and buy recommendations, but few hold or sell recommendations. The descriptive
analysis in section 3 suggests that this intervention by the regulator encouraged the industry to focus on an
equilibrium where more “sell” and “hold” recommendat i o n sw e r ei s s u e d . W ed i v i d et i m ei n t op r ea n dp o s t
“Spitzer” eras with the mid point being the quarter starting in June 2001. Based on coverage in the Wall
Street Journal, we believe this is an appropriate starting point for the very vocal and public criticism of the
industry by a regulator. Therefore, a ﬁrst instrument is this dummy variable. We believe that the actions
of Spitzer helped to shift the equilibrium to a more conservative set of recommendations. It is plausible to
argue that SPITDUM can be excluded from payoffs. The analysts could scarcely be accused of conﬂicts
of interest for recommendations issued at this time because there was very little investment banking work
being done after June of 2001 due to the downturn high technology markets.
26The variable SPITDUM only displays time-series variation. We will interact SPITDUM with SBANK
in order to get cross sectional variation in the instrument as well. This would be an appropriate instrument
if the criticism of the regulators had more impact for stocks where a larger proportion of the analysts were
afﬁliated with brokerages that had traditionally done investment banking work with high technology ﬁrms.
A second set of variables that could enter z include average recommendations for the stock submitted
in previous quarters. Table 3.3 demonstrated that in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000, there were no holds or
sells issued by any analyst in our data set. If an individual analyst deviated from this practice, he might
miscommunicate to investors his views about the relative desirability of stock e. Therefore, we include
behavior in the most recent period since this will communicate information about the norm. Normally,
we would be concerned that this instrument is itself arguably endogenous. However, we note that we can
control for time and stock effects since we have a panel data set. Also, since we also have access to the
instruments based on the actions of the regulator, we can check the robustness of our results both with and
without using lagged behavior as an instrument.
6R e s u l t s
In this section, we discuss the results from our empirical analysis. We will organize our discussion parallel
to the theories discussed in section 3. In section 6.1 we run an ordered probit to study the inﬂuence of
fundamentals such as earnings forecasts and time and stock ﬁxed effects on recommendations. In section
6.2 we run an ordered probit that includes our measures of conﬂicts of interest. Finally, in section 6.3, we
consider the full-blown model that allows for peer effects in the estimates. The models in 6.1 and 6.2 are
single agent ordered probits.
276.1 Fundamentals
The ﬁrst question that we ask is the extent to which recommendations were determined by publicly observ-
able information about the stocks. In our data, these fundamentals correspond to time ﬁxed effects, stock
ﬁxed effects, and the difference between an individual analyst’s beliefs about earnings and beliefs in the
market as whole. In Table 6.1, we run an ordered probit to explore these questions. The variable %DEV
is the percentage deviation of an analyst’s recommendation from the average recommendation and ABS.
DEV is the algebraic difference. In both cases, a more optimistic earnings forecast has the anticipated sign
(-), but is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels in any of the speciﬁcations that we have tried. On the other
hand, quarterly and stock ﬁxed effects are almost all statistically signiﬁcant. If quarter and stock ﬁxed
effects proxy for publicly available information about the stock, then this information is considerably more
important than measures of an individual analyst’s optimism. We note, however, that there could be other
interpretations of these variables.
In Table 6.2, we plot the estimated quarterly ﬁxed effects against the NASDAQ Index and NASDAQ
100. The quarterly effects correspond to the model estimated in the last column of Table 6.1. The
quarterly effects are labeled qdum2-qdum22 for the 2nd through the 22nd quarter of our data set. Several
points emerge. First, the quarterly effects are typically signiﬁcant. Second, the quarterly effects are
highly correlated with the NASDAQ index and with the QQQ. We take these results as evidence that the
quarterly effects can reasonably be interpreted as reﬂecting publicly observed information about ﬁrm value
as opposed to some other latent effects. The movement in share prices can explain most of the movement
in the recommendations in the previous tables. In Table 6.3, we regress the quarterly dummies on these
indexes. We ﬁnd that the indexes are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels and that the measures of
28goodness of ﬁta r eq u i t eh i g h .
6.2 Conﬂicts of Interest
In table 6.4 we run an ordered probit on recommendations as a function of our conﬂict of interest measures.
The coefﬁcient on RELATION indicates that potential conﬂicts of interest are statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels, except for the third column. The coefﬁcient’s sign is also consistent with our a priori
beliefs that conﬂicts of interest could lead to issuing more favorable recommendations. However, these
results must be interpreted with some caution. Since brokerage ﬁrms are expected to cover companies with
whom they have signiﬁcant investment banking business, the ﬁrms have an incentive to select brokerages
that already view them favorably. It would be hard to imagine that a rational manager would want to hire
an investment banking ﬁrm that views her company in an unfavorable manner.
Interestingly, we note (column 4 of table 6.4) that when we include the IBANK variable denoting that
the brokerage ﬁrm has investment banking relationships with at least one ﬁrm in the index, the coefﬁcient is
positive and signiﬁcant. Evidently, analysts at general investment banking ﬁr m st e n dt oi s s u es l i g h t l ym o r e
conservative recommendations. This is consistent with a view of the world that companies tended to select
investment banking ﬁrms that were more favorably disposed towards them. Alternatively, our results could
be interpreted as suffering from a bias due to some omitted variable.
Our results suggest that even though investment banking relationships may generate potential conﬂicts
of interest for equity analysts, the magnitude of the effects recommendations appear tobesmall. Noticethat
measures of the goodness of ﬁt are very low when only investment banking is included. Also, the marginal
effects on recommendations of engaging in investment banking are small. In our data, the expected rec-
ommendation is -0.08 when we allow for quarterly ﬁxed effects, but not stock ﬁxed effects. This ﬁnding
29is not consistent with the prosecutors’ belief that “unbiased” research, separate from investment banking,
will generate recommendations signiﬁcantly less tainted by potential conﬂicts of interest. However, the
behavior of analysts after large settlements have been paid and signiﬁcant damage has been done to their
brokerage’s reputation, in some cases, may be more conservative.
6.3 Peer Effects
The ﬁnal question we consider is whether there are peer effects in submitting recommendations. We
do this by using the two-stage procedure described in the previous section. First, we ﬂexibly model the
expectations of individual analysts about the recommendations that will be submitted by other analysts. We




3. SBANK- the fraction of analysts that have IBANK equal to one
4. SPITDUM- a dummy for whether the quarter follows the quarter in which Elliot Spitzer began pub-
licly questioning the research quality of Wall Street analysts
5. ESHIFT-the interaction of spitdum and sbank
6. LAG-the lagged value of the average recommendation for the stock
In our analysis, we will assume that variables 4-6 above are valid exclusion restrictions in the sense
that they shift the equilibrium that is played in the market, but do not directly enter into an analyst’s utility
function. The excluded variables are signiﬁcant in this ﬁrst-stage regression. We will let IVBELIEF denote
the ﬁtted value of the regression and include this variable in the second stage as measure of analysts’ beliefs
about their peers.
The results from the second-stage are in Table 6.5. In all of the speciﬁcations that we examine, peer
effects seem to be important. An individual analyst will raise his recommendation proportionally to the
30recommendation that he expects from other analysts. This is intuitive. A given recommendation does not
make sense in isolation, but only relative to the recommendations of other analysts. For example, if all
analysts consider a stock “average” in some sense, then an individual analyst would give the wrong signal
by issuing a recommendation of “3” when his peers issue a recommendation of “2”.
Itisworthnotingthatourpeereffectresultsarenotonlystatisticallysigniﬁcant. Peereffectsalsoexplain
the results quite well compared to the other covariates. The Pseudo-R2 using the average recommendation
alone is 0.07. Including time and stock effects (our measure of fundamentals) raises it to 0.085. The
investment banking relationship is not signiﬁcant in our ﬁnal column and does not increase measures of
goodness of ﬁt.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Two factors seem to be most important for explaining the production of stock recommendations. First,
publiclyobservableinformationaboutthestocksunderrecommendation, asreﬂectedinourtimeandquarter
dummies, plays a large role in explaining the distribution of recommendations. As we saw in Table 4.3,
these variables explained a large fraction of the variation in the data and were highly correlated with market
indexes such as the NASDAQ or QQQ. Simply put, recommendations improved in 1999-2000 as the
stock market rose. The second and most important factor for explaining recommendations is the peer
group effect. Individual analysts raise their recommendations proportionally to the recommendations they
expect from their peers. Investment banking relationships are shown to be statistically signiﬁcant in the
recommendations regressions, but the economic effect of this variable is estimated to be small. Indeed, this
variable is not statistically signiﬁcant at all in the full-blown model with peer effects.
In the wake of the many conﬂict of interest allegations that surfaced following the collapse of technol-
31ogy shares in 2000, policymakers have proposed a wide range of reforms for the industry. These proposals
range from mandating greater separation of the investment banking and the brokerage functions, to forcing
the complete spin-off of research from brokerage ﬁrms. Taken at face value, our ﬁndings suggest that none
of these proposals would have much effect on reducing conﬂicts of interest. If more stringent regulation
imposed costs on brokerage ﬁrms, this could discourage spending on research and limit the ﬂow of infor-
mation to the markets. Our sample of recommendations on technology ﬁrms is taken from a period when
the potential for investment banking conﬂict of interest was relatively great, yet we still ﬁnd little impact of
the investment banking relationship on recommendations.
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34Table 3.1: Recommendation Variables. 
Recommendation  Numerical Value Recorded by I/B/E/S 








Table 3.2: Summary Statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. Min. Max.  Nobs 
Recommendation 2.210  0.9168  1  5  12719 
Relation 0.0350  0.1839  0  1  12719 
Ibank 0.8155  0.3878  0  1  12719 




Table 3.3: Tabulation of Recommendations by Quarter. 
Variable/Time Period  Q1 1998  Q1 2000  Q2 2003 
% Recs. Equal to 1  30.51  46.73  11.65 
% Recs. Equal to 2  30.51  41.46  18.12 
% Recs. Equal to 3  37.62  11.81  53.07 
% Recs. Equal to 4  1.02  0.00  12.62 









Table 6.1 Ordered Probit Estimates of the Effect of Fundamentals. 
Varible  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
%DEV  -.0539 (-0.276)  -.1030 (-0.519)  -  - 
ABS. DEV      -.1030 (-0.519)  - 
     
Log  Likelihood  -16171.589 -14861.218 -14861.218 -14861.352 
Psueo-R
2  0.0000 0.0810 0.0810 0.0810 
Fixed Effects  none  quarterly,stock  quarterly, stock  quarterly, stock 
In the ordered probit model, the dependent variable is the analyst’s recommendation as coded by IBES.  
This takes on discrete values from one to five.  In the table above, t-statistics are included in parentheses.  






Table 6.2 Quarterly Effects Versus Market Indexes. 
Variable Coefficient  T-Statistic  NASDAQ  QQQ 
qdum2 -0.1865  -1.979  1,770  
qdum3 -0.15266  -1.803  1,509  
qdum4 -0.24117  -2.258  1,928  
qdum5 -0.27011  -3.134  2,207  102.25 
qdum6 -0.36868  -4.297  2,467  103.87 
qdum7 -0.46412  -5.485  2,752  120.12 
qdum8 -0.43603  -5.149  3,341  148.63 
qdum9 -0.6408  -7.394  4,732  214.5 
qdum10 -0.43113  -4.973  3,471  85.19 
qdum11 -0.35704  -3.958  4,252 103 
qdum12 -0.08381  -1.031  2,664  64.06 
qdum13 0.07177  0.955  2,126  46.97 
qdum14 0.04712  0.632  2,131  85.19 
qdum15 0.063716  0.79 1,802  36.51 
qdum16 0.128908  1.671  1,915  39.29 
qdum17 0.217669  2.86 1,745  34.15 
qdum18 0.349657  4.631  1,613  30 
qdum19 0.630952  8.753  1,403  26.05 
qdum20 1.009163  13.389  1,887  21.07 
qdum21 0.572553  7.596  1,345  24.72 




Table 6.3 Regression of Dummies on Market Indexes. 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient 
Constant  .8208896 (3.965)  0.6270 (4.3) 
Nasdaq Index  -.0003467 (-4.960)  - 
QQQ Price  -  -0.007 (-4.7) 
    
Nobs 21  18 
R







 Table 6.4 Ordered Probit Estimates of the Effect of Conflicts of Interest. 
Varible  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
RELATION  -.3231 (-6.19)  -.1108 (-2.06)    .05397 (0.94)    .03932 (0.68) 
IBANK      .1080  (4.18) 
     
Log Likelihood  -16152.389       -15314.605  -14860.888       -14855.94 
Psueo-R
2  0.0012 0.0530 0.0811 0.0814 
Fixed Effects  none  quarterly  quarterly, stock  quarterly, stock 
In the ordered probit model, the dependent variable is the analyst’s recommendation as coded by IBES.  
This takes on discrete values from one to five.  In the table above, t-statistics are included in parentheses.  





Table 6.5 Ordered Probit Estimates including Peer Effects. 
Varible  Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
IVBELIEF  1.289 (46.16)  1.2911 (22.174)   .7603 (7.684)  .7816 (7.47) 
RELATION      .0537    (0.93) 
%DEV      -.1140  (-0.57) 
     
Log likelihood  -14720.112       -14719.611       -14475.708       -14476.514 
Psuedo-R
2  0.0695 0.0695 0.0850 0.0849 
Fixed Effects  none  stock  quarterly, stock  quarterly, stock 
In the ordered probit model, the dependent variable is the analyst’s recommendation as coded by IBES.  
This takes on discrete values from one to five.  In the table above, t-statistics are included in parentheses.  
Most of the quarterly and stock fixed effects are significant in the specifications that we study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 